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Abstract
The right to counsel of juveniles at the stage of police inter-
rogations has gained significant attention since the Salduz
ruling of the European Court on Human Rights in 2008. The
legislative and policy developments that have taken place
since then and that are still ongoing – both on a regional
(European) and domestic (Dutch) level – reveal a shared
belief that juvenile suspects must be awarded special protec-
tion in this phase of the criminal justice proceedings. This
calls for a youth-specific approach as fundamentally differ-
ent from the common approach for adults. At the same
time, there seems to be ambivalence concerning the justifi-
cation and concrete implications of such a youth-specific
approach. This article aims to clarify the underlying rationale
and significance of a youth specific approach to the right to
counsel at the stage of police interrogations on the basis of
an interdisciplinary analysis of European Court on Human
Rights case law, international children’s rights standards and
relevant developmental psychological insights. In addition,
this article aims to position this right of juveniles in conflict
with the law in the particular context of the Dutch juvenile
justice system and provide concrete recommendations to
the Dutch legislator.
Keywords: legal representation, counsel, juvenile justice,
police interrogations, children’s rights
1 Introduction
Influenced by recent developments in the case law of
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the
Dutch Supreme Court ruled, on the 30th of June 2009,
that all arrested suspects have the right to consult a
lawyer prior to the first police interrogation and that
juvenile suspects have the additional right of having a
lawyer or other representative present during the police
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interrogation.1 The Dutch Supreme Court, thus, clari-
fied that juveniles are entitled to a higher level of pro-
tection at the stage of police interrogations. This ‘youth-
specific’ ruling has had a significant impact on the
Dutch practice of legal representation of juvenile sus-
pects in the earliest stage of criminal investigation. In
2010, a youth-specific policy approach to the right to
counsel was adopted in the policy directive ‘Aanwijzing
rechtsbijstand politieverhoor’, commissioned by the Board
of Procurators General,2 followed by a 2011 Draft Bill
on legal representation in the context of police interrog-
ations.3 In February 2014, the Draft Bill was divided
into two separate Draft Bills.4
Both in the Netherlands and internationally, there
seems to be consensus that juvenile suspects must be
awarded special protection at the stage of police inter-
rogations, which calls for a youth-specific approach fun-
damentally different from the common approach for
adults. At the same time, there is ambivalence concern-
ing the justifications underlying a youth-specific
approach and the concrete implications of such an
approach. With regard to the latter, it is interesting to
note that the Dutch Supreme Court defines the pres-
ence of a lawyer during police interrogations as the key
element of a youth-specific approach, while the recently
adopted European Union (EU) Directive on the right of
access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings5 indicates that
the right to legal counsel at the stage of police interroga-
tions has more or less similar implications for accused
juveniles and adults, even though the ‘particular needs
of vulnerable suspects’ (i.e. among others, minors) have
1. Dutch Supreme Court, 30 June 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH3081.
2. 'Aanwijzing Rechtsbijstand Politieverhoor', Dutch Bulletin of Acts and
Decrees, at 4003 (2010).
3. Draft Bill of 15 April 2011. Retrieved from: <www. rijksoverheid. nl/
documenten -en -publicaties/ regelingen/ 2011/ 04/ 18/ wetsvoorst -
rechtsbijstand -en -politieverhoor. html>.
4. Draft Bills of 13 February 2014. Retrieved from: <www. rijksoverheid. nl/
nieuws/ 2014/ 02/ 13/ recht -op -bijstand -van -raadsman -tijdens -
politieverhoor. html>.
5. Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
22 October 2013, OJ 2013 L 294. See in particular Art. 13.
206
ELR December 2014 | No. 4
to be taken into account by Member States.6 In addi-
tion, the European Union is currently preparing a
youth-specific EU Directive, which is much more
concrete in terms of awarding juvenile suspects special
protection and is strongly influenced by the children’s
rights-oriented Guidelines for Child Friendly Justice of
the Council of Europe.7 Despite these developments, it
is still not entirely clear what the justifications are for a
youth-specific approach to the right to counsel and what
its implications are or should be.
This article aims to clarify the underlying rationale and
significance of a youth-specific approach to the right to
legal counsel at the stage of police interrogations on the
basis of an interdisciplinary analysis of ECtHR case law,
international children’s rights standards and develop-
mental psychological insights regarding this issue. In
addition, this article aims to position this right in the
particular context of the Dutch juvenile justice system
and provide concrete recommendations to the Dutch
legislator.
After a brief introduction to the Dutch juvenile justice
system (§2) followed by an overview of developments
regarding the juvenile’s right to counsel at the stage of
police interrogations in the Netherlands, influenced by
the ECtHR case law (§3), we zoom in on the youth-
specific approach to the right to legal counsel in ECtHR
case law and international children’s rights standards
(§4). Subsequently, we provide a developmental psycho-
logical perspective to the right to counsel at the stage of
police interrogations (§5). Then, we position the youth-
specific approach to the right to legal counsel in the
particular context of the Dutch juvenile justice system,
including recent legislative developments (§6), followed
by some concluding remarks (§7).
2 The Dutch Juvenile Justice
System: A Dual Approach
The Netherlands has a separate juvenile justice system
for minors8 between age 12 and 18. The rules governing
this separate juvenile justice system are not laid down in
a specific juvenile justice Act, but can be found in the
Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) and the Criminal
Code (CC) which are applicable to both adults and
juveniles, but provide for several specific provisions
regarding the prosecution, adjudication and sanctioning
6. This position is also defended by Advocate General Spronken, who
pleads, with reference to more recent case law of the ECtHR, for
embracement of the right to legal counsel during police interrogations
as a fundamental part of a fair trial for all arrested suspects in the Dutch
criminal justice system, regardless of their age. See Legal Opinion of
A-G Spronken, 26 November 2013, ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:1424.
7. Commission proposal of 27 November 2013 for a directive of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council on procedural safeguards for chil-
dren suspected or accused in criminal proceedings (COM(2013)822
final).
8. We refer to minors, children or juveniles as persons under the age of 18
when they allegedly committed an offence, falling under the scope of
juvenile justice. In addition, we write in a masculine form.
of juveniles. Consequently, the Dutch juvenile justice
system strongly corresponds to its adult equivalent.
Similar to the Dutch adult criminal justice system, the
justification for imposing juvenile justice interventions
lies in the individual’s culpability and responsibility for
committing an offence.9 Core substantive notions in the
Dutch adult criminal justice system, such as culpability,
are equally present in the juvenile justice system. The
same applies for the descriptions of the offences as laid
down in the CC and most of the procedural rules
embodied in the CCP, inter alia, concerning the applica-
tion of coercive measures during the pre-trial investiga-
tion.10
Nevertheless, the Dutch juvenile justice system clearly
has a different character, which lies in its pedagogical
approach.11 This approach distinguishes the juvenile
justice system from the adult criminal justice system
and is operationalised through a number of specific pro-
cedural rules for juveniles, including a court appointed
lawyer, trial in a youth court (in camera), a special role
for the Child Care and Protection Board and the
involvement of parents, among others in the first stages
of criminal proceedings (Articles 486-509 of the CCP).
In addition, there is a separate penal system
(Articles 77a-77kk of the CC), which contains different,
less severe sentences and a strong focus on education,
behaviour modification and recidivism reduction. Addi-
tionally, specialised professionals and organisations,
such as the already mentioned Child Care and
Protection Board, the Youth Probation Office and spe-
cial juvenile institutions, are involved in all stages of the
juvenile justice procedure and enforcement of
sentences. The existence of youth-specific procedural
provisions, sanctions and institutions boils down to the
acknowledgement that juveniles cannot yet be consid-
ered fully developed and accountable, and therefore
deserve a special approach that takes into account their
age and level of maturity.12
The primary objective of Dutch juvenile justice is
(re-)education, reintegration and prevention of recidi-
vism (special prevention), although retribution, general
prevention (deterrence), protection of society and public
order and compensation for victims and society can also
be considered as objectives.13 The Dutch juvenile jus-
tice system is furthermore characterised by the pivotal
position of the notion of ‘best interests of the child’,
which aims to prevent the juvenile justice system from
having a negative impact on the child’s short- and long-
9. I. Weijers, ‘Grondslagen van jeugdstrafrecht’, in I. Weijers and
F. Imkamp (eds.), Jeugdstrafrecht. In internationaal perspectief (2011)
31; G. de Jonge and A.P. van der Linden, Handboek Jeugd & Strafrecht
(2013), at 77 ff. and 181 ff.; J. Uit Beijerse, Jeugdstrafrecht. Beginselen,
wetgeving en praktijk (2013), at 13-35.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. M.R. Bruning et al., Wegwijs in het jeugdsanctierecht (2010).
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term interests (cf. Article 3(1) and 40(1) of the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child; CRC).14
In conclusion, the Dutch juvenile justice system
recognises the need for a specialised juvenile oriented,
pedagogical approach with a firm focus of both eyes on
the child’s (future) behaviour and the prevention of
negative effects on the child’s best interests and devel-
opment while safeguarding the right to a fair trial. The
concrete implications of this dual approach depend on
the phase of the juvenile justice system.
3 Juveniles’ Right to Counsel:
An Overview of Recent
Developments
3.1 ECtHR Case Law: Salduz and Panovits
In November 2008, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR
issued a landmark ruling in the case of Salduz v. Turkey,
in which it leaves no doubt that the right to a fair trial as
laid down in Article 6(1) of the ECHR requires that
‘access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first
interrogation of a suspect by the police’.15 This right
may only be restricted when the authorities demonstrate
in the light of the particular circumstances of each case
that there are compelling reasons to do so. According to
the Court, ‘the rights of the defence will in principle be
irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements
made during police interrogation without access to a
lawyer are used for a conviction’. As to this, the Court
explicitly emphasised ‘the fundamental importance of
providing access to a lawyer where the person in custo-
dy is a minor’.16
Shortly after the Salduz judgment, the ECtHR issued a
judgment in the case of Panovits v. Cyprus, in which it
further elaborates on the juvenile’s right to counsel at
the initial stages of police interrogation. The Court
ruled, on the basis of youth-specific considerations that
underscore the particular capacities and vulnerability of
minors in the context of police interrogations,17 that
minors are entitled to legal or other assistance during
police interrogations in order to enable them to partici-
pate effectively in the proceedings, which is an impor-
tant part of the right to a fair trial.18 Nevertheless, the
Court makes clear that the minor’s possibility to waive
his right to counsel must be recognised, although it pla-
ces the authorities under special scrutiny.19
Thus, under the case law of the ECtHR, the right to
counsel as from the initial stages of criminal justice is
considered a fundamental value of the right to a fair tri-
14. I. Weijers, ‘Grondslagen van jeugdstrafrecht’, in I. Weijers and
F. Imkamp (eds.), Jeugdstrafrecht. In internationaal perspectief (2011)
31, at 49-51.
15. Salduz v. Turkey, ECHR (2008) No. 36391/02, para. 55.
16. Ibid., para. 60.
17. See para. 4.1.
18. Panovits v. Cyprus, ECHR (2008) No. 4268/04, paras. 67 and 68.
19. Ibid., para. 68.
al, with particular relevance for the position of minors
subjected to police interrogations, as individuals in need
of additional protection.
3.2 Dutch Supreme Court
In the Netherlands, the rulings of the European Court
of Human Rights in Salduz and Panovits led to com-
motion amongst legal scholars, law practitioners and
policymakers alike. Although the exact implications of
this new ECtHR case law were not utterly clear,20 it was
assumed that the Dutch system did not meet the
requirements set out in the ECtHR judgments, since
Dutch law did not provide for a suspect’s right to legal
counsel as early as the initial stage of police interroga-
tions.
On the 30th of June 2009, the Dutch Supreme Court
provided clarity by issuing rulings in three cases, in
which it interprets the standards set by the ECtHR and
their implications for the Dutch criminal and juvenile
justice system.21 The Supreme Court considered that
every arrested suspect22 has the right to consult a lawyer
before the first police interrogation. This means that,
prior to the first police interrogation, the arrested
suspect should be sufficiently informed about his right
to consult a lawyer. Apart from the situation in which
the suspect – explicitly or silently, yet unequivocal-
ly23 – expresses a wish to waive this right or in case
compelling reasons justify denial of access to a lawyer,
the authorities should take all reasonable steps to ensure
that the suspect fully enjoys his right to consult a lawyer
prior to police interrogation.24 When the authorities fail
to meet this obligation, incriminating statements made
by the suspect during the police interrogation cannot be
used as evidence for a conviction.25
The Supreme Court made clear that these considera-
tions regarding the right to consult a lawyer prior to
police interrogation apply for all arrested suspects, both
adults and minors. Yet, as to minors in particular, the
20. They remain subject to debate. One specific issue concerns the question
as to what extent the ECtHR has proclaimed that a suspect has the right
to have his or her lawyer present during police interrogations. See the
debate in NJB: M.J. Borgers, ‘Een nieuwe dageraad voor de rechtsbij-
stand bij het politieverhoor?’, 61 NJB 88 (2009); T.N.B.M. Spronken,
‘Ja, de zon komt op voor de raadsman bij het politieverhoor!’, 62 NJB
(2009); A.J.M. de Swart, ‘Toch nog een raadsman bij het politiever-
hoor?’, 166 NJB (2010); A.J.M. de Swart, ‘Update Salduz-doctrine.
Toch nog een raadsman bij het politieverhoor? Part II’, 2190 NJB
(2010); M.J. Borgers, ‘De ijdele hoop van Pishchalnikov en Brusco’, 166
NJB (2010); J.T.C. van Lelieveld and P. van Kampen, ‘Rechtsbijstand in
de voorfase van het strafproces’, 2191 NJB (2013). See also: A. Beijer,
‘False Confessions during Police Interrogations and Measures to Prevent
Them’, 18 Eur. J. Crime Crim. L. & Crim. Just. 311, at 312-13 (2010);
C.H. Brants, ‘The Reluctant Dutch Response to Salduz’, 15 EdinLR 298
(2011).
21. Dutch Supreme Court, 30 June 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH3081.
22. The Dutch Supreme Court repeatedly emphasised that, in principle, only
arrested suspects enjoy the Salduz right to legal counsel. See: Dutch
Supreme Court, 9 November 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BN7727; Dutch
Supreme Court, 11 June 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:CA2555.
23. Cf. Dutch Supreme Court, 21 January 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:133,
paras. 3.5 and 3.6.
24. Dutch Supreme Court, 30 June 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH3081,
para. 2.5.
25. Ibid., paras. 2.7.1-2.7.3.
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Supreme Court ruled that they also have an additional
right to assistance by a lawyer or another ‘person of
trust’ during the police interrogations.26 The Dutch
Supreme Court, thus, interpreted the right to (legal)
assistance as from the initial stage of police interroga-
tions under Article 6 of the ECHR significantly broader
when minors are concerned.
3.3 Dutch Policy Directive on Legal Counsel at
Police Interrogation
The Dutch Supreme Court pointed out that it is up to
the legislator or policymakers to draft general guidelines
regulating the right to have access to legal counsel in the
initial stages of police interrogation.27 Against this back-
ground, the Board of Procurators General drafted the
Aanwijzing Rechtsbijstand Politieverhoor (Policy Direc-
tive on Legal Counsel at Police Interrogation) in 2010,
outlining the official Dutch policy regarding the right to
legal counsel for both adults and minors at the stage of
police interrogation.28
According to the Directive, the scope of the right to
counsel in the initial stage of the police interrogations
depends on the severity of the case and the vulnerability
of the suspect. The latter represents the recognition of
the particular position of minors. The Directive stipu-
lates that minors accused of an offence have the right to
legal counsel prior to police interrogation and the right
to assistance by a lawyer or another representative dur-
ing police interrogation. With regard to the right to
waive legal or other appropriate assistance, the Directive
distinguishes between different groups of minors
according to age and seriousness of the offence. When it
comes to 12- to 15-year-olds, there is no possibility to
waive the right to prior consultation of a lawyer in case
the accusation concerns a felony for which the use of
pre-trial detention is allowed by law (i.e. a severer
offence); yet in case of specific minor offences or misde-
meanours, this group of minors can waive their right to
counsel. As far as 16- and 17-year-olds are concerned,
the right to prior consultation cannot be waived in case
of the most serious felonies (i.e. a violent or sexual
assault such as murder, homicide/manslaughter, rape,
etc.); however, it can be done if the charge concerns a
less serious offence or a misdemeanour.
During his consultation of a lawyer, the minor can
decide whether or not to exercise the right to counsel
during the interrogation. If a minor waives his right to
consult a lawyer prior to the police interrogation, this
automatically implies a waiver of his right to legal assis-
tance during police interrogations. If a minor waives his
right to legal assistance, he remains entitled to have a
‘person of trust’ present during the police interroga-
tions. This person of trust could be one of his parents or
legal guardians or another confidant of the minor. A
person of trust has no independent right to be present
26. Ibid., para. 2.6.
27. Dutch Supreme Court, 30 June 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH3081, para.
2.4.
28. 'Aanwijzing Rechtsbijstand Politieverhoor', Bulletin of Acts and
Decrees, at 4003 (2010).
during the police interrogations; it is up to the minor to
decide. Besides, the presence of a person of trust during
police interrogations is only permitted when there is no
lawyer present.
As to the role of the lawyer during the police interroga-
tion, the Policy Directive provides that a reticent
approach is required in order to limit the lawyer’s influ-
ence on the interrogations (i.e. process of truth finding)
as much as possible. The lawyer’s main task is to
observe possible police inflicted unlawful pressure on
the minor and to make sure that the minor understands
the questions and the transcription of the interrogation.
As far as the person of trust is concerned, the Policy
Directive prescribes that he is not allowed to interrupt
the interrogation or to make contact with the suspect
during the police interrogation, but does not provide
further clarity about the function of the person of trust
during the interrogation.
The question to what extent a minor should have the
right to waive his right to consult a lawyer prior to the
police interrogation has been addressed by Dutch
courts. The Dutch District Court of Amsterdam ruled
in 2009 that minors should not have the opportunity to
waive their right to consult a lawyer, because of their
susceptibility to pressure and the lack of capacity to
oversee the consequences of their decisions.29 Other
courts, however, including the Amsterdam Criminal
Court of Appeal ruled that the right to waive legal
counsel should be upheld, but places authorities under
scrutiny as stipulated by the European Court of Human
Rights.30
3.4 Dutch Forthcoming Statutory Legislation
In 2011, the Dutch legislator presented the first draft of
a bill, which aims to implement the abovementioned
ECtHR case law in Dutch statutory legislation. The
Draft Bill builds further on the Policy Directive on
Legal Counsel at Police Interrogation, although there
are some differences. For example, the legislative pro-
posal explicitly chooses to implement a juvenile’s right
to legal counsel rather than other forms of assistance
(e.g. assistance by one of the parents). Moreover, the
proposal abandons the distinction between 12- to
15-year-olds and 16- and 17-year-olds, as established in
the abovementioned (Dutch) Directive. According to
the proposal, every minor from 12 to 17 years of age
who is suspected of committing an offence is entitled to
consultation with a lawyer prior to the first police
interrogation, without the possibility of waiver, also
when it concerns minor offences (e.g. so-called HALT-
feiten, which can be settled by a police diversion inter-
vention). In addition, the juvenile can decide whether or
29. District Court Amsterdam, 13 November 2009, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:
2009:BK4115 and 24 September 2009, No. 13/854677-09 (unpublish-
ed); see also M.R. Bruning, ‘Salduz/Panovits bij jeugdstrafzaken; het
volle pond of een onsje minder?’, 32-2 FJR 21 (2010).
30. Amsterdam Court of Appeal, 9 December 2010, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:
2010:BO8217, BO8219, BO8221 and BO8230; see also District Court
of Haarlem, 10 November 2009, ECLI:NL:RBHAA:2009:BK3403 and
District Court of The Hague, 3 September 2009, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:
2009:BJ7233.
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not to exercise the right to counsel during the interroga-
tion. He can make his decision on the basis of the con-
sultation with the lawyer prior to the interrogation.31
In 2011, the Dutch legislative process was put on a hold,
while waiting for the outcome of the pending EU ‘legis-
lative’ developments. More than two years later, on the
22 October 2013, the EU Directive (2013/48/EU) on
the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings
came into force.32 In February 2014, the State Secretary
divided the 2011 Draft Bill into two separate draft bills.
One draft bill specifically aims to implement the EU
Directive (2013/48/EU). The other draft bill adds
some new provisions that regulate the early stage of the
criminal investigation. When it comes to the dismissal of
the juvenile’s right to waiver and the legislator’s explicit
choice to implement the right to legal counsel rather
than other types of assistance during police inter-
rogations, the 2014 Draft Bill on implementing EU
Directive (2013/48/EU) remains the same compared to
the 2011 Draft Bill.33
3.5 Directive 2013/48/EU and Other EU
Developments
EU Directive 2013/48/EU obliges Member States to
regulate the right to legal counsel at the stage of police
interrogation in statutory legislation in accordance with
the minimum standards as provided in the Directive.
The way in which Member States live up to their obli-
gation to implement these minimum standards is largely
left to their discretion.
The EU Directive itself does not provide much
guidance regarding the particular legal position of juve-
niles at the stage of police interrogations, apart from the
general remark in the Preamble that the Directive ‘pro-
motes the rights of children and takes into account the
Guidelines of the Council of Europe on child friendly
justice’ and ‘ensures that suspects and accused persons,
including children, are provided with adequate informa-
tion to understand the consequences of waiving a right
and that any such waiver is made voluntarily and
unequivocally’.34 The only (indirect) reference to the
legal position of accused juveniles at the stage of police
interrogation in the actual provisions of the Directive
might be Article 13: ‘Member States shall ensure that
the particular needs of vulnerable suspects and
vulnerable accused persons are taken into account in the
application of this Directive.’
Consequently, it is largely up to the Dutch legislator to
determine – on the basis of ECtHR case law and other
relevant sources – the legal position of accused juveniles
at the stage of police interrogations in the forthcoming
statutory act. However, it is to be expected that the EU
will also adopt a youth-specific Directive on procedural
safeguards for children suspected or accused in criminal
proceedings, which aims to give more specific guidance
31. See Explanatory Memorandum, Arts. 489 (new) and 490 (new) of the
CCP.
32. EU Directive 2013/48/EU, OJ 2013 L 294/1.
33. This article covers legislative developments until the 15th of June 2014.
34. EU Directive 2013/48/EU, OJ 2013 L 294/1, at preamble, para. 55.
to the domestic legislator.35 Some key features of this
proposal are mandatory access to a lawyer (i.e. no right
to waive the right to access, save in case of some minor
offences; Article 6) and audiovisual recordings of police
interrogations (Article 9).
Having discussed the recent European and national
developments, it is time to look in more detail at the jus-
tifications for a youth-specific approach and its implica-
tions. We will, first, go briefly back to the Salduz and
Panovits cases to take a closer look at the considerations
that lie at the heart of the ECtHR’s youth-specific
approach and to analyse these in the context of (other)
international children’s rights standards, including the
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and related
UN resolutions, two of the General Comments of the
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child and relevant
children’s rights standards developed by the Council of
Europe.
4 Juveniles’ Right to Counsel:
A Children’s Rights
Perspective
4.1 The ECtHR’s Youth-Specific Approach
The European Court’s Grand Chamber judgment in
Salduz v. Turkey explicitly recognises the right to legal
assistance for minors as from the first interrogation of a
suspect by the police as an essential part of the right to a
fair trial under Article 6(1) ECHR. The European
Court elaborates on this and provides more clarity in
Panovits v. Cyprus by emphasising that children
involved in criminal proceedings ‘shall be dealt with in a
manner which takes full account of their age, level of
maturity and intellectual and emotional capacities’ and
by stressing that the authorities should take action to
encourage the child’s ability to understand and partici-
pate in the proceedings.36 In addition, the Court under-
scores that ‘the right of an accused minor to effective
participation in his or her criminal trial requires that he
be dealt with, with due regard to his vulnerability and
capacities from the first stages of his involvement in a
criminal investigation and, in particular, during any
questioning by the police’.37 As to this, the Court urges
the authorities to take action ‘to reduce as far as possible
the minor’s feelings of intimidation and inhibition and
ensure that the accused minor has a broad understand-
ing of the nature of the investigation, of what is at stake
for him or her, including the significance of any penalty
which may be imposed as well as of his rights of defence
and, in particular, of his right to remain silent’.38 It
35. Commission proposal of 27 November 2013 for a directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on procedural safeguards for
children suspected or accused in criminal proceedings (COM(2013)822
final).
36. Panovits v. Cyprus, ECHR (2008) No. 4268/04, para. 67.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
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means that the minor ‘if necessary with the assistance of,
for example, an interpreter, lawyer, social worker or
friend, should be able to understand the general thrust
of what is said by the arresting officer and during his
questioning by the police’.39
When it comes to the minor’s possibility of waiving the
right to counsel, the Court emphasises the particular
vulnerability of an accused minor and the imbalance of
power, which is inherent to the very nature of criminal
proceedings.40 This leads to the Court’s conclusion that
waiving the minor’s right to counsel during police inter-
rogation by him or on his behalf should be subject to
extra scrutiny on the side of the authorities. A waiver
can only be accepted ‘where it is expressed in an
unequivocal manner after the authorities have taken all
reasonable steps to ensure that he or she [the juvenile] is
fully aware of his rights of defence and can appreciate,
as far as possible, the consequence of his conduct’.41
The Court’s abovementioned considerations clearly
indicate a recognition of the particular importance of the
right to counsel at the stage of the first police interroga-
tions when minors are concerned; it is considered an
essential part of the minor’s right to a fair trial under
Article 6 of the ECHR, which also includes his right to
participate effectively in the proceedings. As to its
youth-specific approach, the Court seems inspired by
the international framework of children’s rights, consist-
ing of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC) and specific provisions in international human
rights treaties and other legal instruments. In Salduz v.
Turkey, the Court explicitly refers to, amongst others,
Article 37 of the CRC and General Comment No. 10 of
the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child.42 In
Panovits v. Cyprus, the Court brings up the provision of
Article 14(4) of the ICCPR, which prescribes that when
juveniles are concerned, the criminal justice procedure
will take account of their age and the desirability of pro-
moting their rehabilitation.43
Moreover, in the Panovits case, the Court reconfirms its
previous case law, in which it has built its youth-specific
approach to Article 6 of the ECHR amongst others on
children’s rights standards developed by the United
Nations and the Council of Europe.44 In this regard, it is
important to point at T v. United Kingdom, in which the
Court ruled, with explicit reference to Article 40 of the
CRC, that ‘a child charged with an offence [must be]
dealt with in a manner which takes full account of his
age, level of maturity and intellectual and emotional
capacities, and that steps are taken to promote his ability
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., paras. 67 and 68.
41. Ibid., para. 68. After Panovits the ECtHR issued various other judg-
ments, which elaborated upon the ruling of the Grand Chamber in Sal-
duz, but without concrete implications for minors; see for an overview
e.g. P. van Kampen and J. Leliveld, ‘Rechtsbijstand in de voorfase van
het strafproces’, 2191 NJB 2604 (2013).
42. Salduz v. Turkey, ECHR (2008) No. 36391/02, paras. 34 and 35.
43. Panovits v. Cyprus, ECHR (2008) No. 4268/04, para. 41.
44. See: Panovits v. Cyprus, ECHR (2008) No. 4268/04, para. 67 in con-
junction with T. v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (1999) No. 24724/94,
paras. 43 and 44.
to understand and participate in the proceedings’.45
This ruling underscores that there are specific require-
ments for effective participation of juveniles as part of
their right to a fair trial (Article 6 of the ECHR), which
according to Kilkelly is ‘a persuasive restatement of the
fundamental nature of these rights’.46 The Court has
also ruled, in S.C. v. United Kingdom, that the right to
effective participation does not imply that the juvenile
should ‘understand or be capable of understanding
every point of law or evidential detail’, but that he ‘has a
broad understanding of the nature of the trial process
and of what is at stake for him or her.47 In light of this,
the right to legal or other representation is regarded
essential.48
4.2 International Children’s Rights Standards
The case law of the ECtHR is strongly connected with
the approaches towards juveniles suspected or accused
of committing crimes as reflected by international (UN)
and regional (for this purpose Council of Europe)
children’s rights standards.
4.2.1 United Nations
Since 1985, the United Nations (UN) has developed
several standards to improve and safeguard the legal
position of children in the juvenile justice system,
including the 1985 Standard Minimum Rules for the
Administration of Juvenile Justice (the ‘Beijing Rules’),
the 1990 Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived
of their Liberty (the ‘Havana Rules’), the 1990
Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency
(the ‘Riyadh Guidelines’) and most importantly the
1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
In 2007 the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
issued a General Comment on the meaning and implica-
tions of the relevant provisions of the CRC (primarily
Articles 40 and 37) for the juvenile justice system at the
domestic level (‘General Comment No. 10’).49 This
serves as recommendation to States Parties that have
ratified the CRC (i.e. at the time of writing, all 193 UN
Member States, except the United States, Somalia and
South Sudan).50
These UN children’s rights standards touch upon the
juvenile’s right to legal counsel at the stage of police
interrogations. Article 40(2)(b)(ii) of the CRC requires
that every child has the right ‘to be informed promptly
and directly of the charges against him or her, and, if
appropriate, through his or her parents or legal
45. T. v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (1999) No. 24724/94, para. 84. See
also V. v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (1999) No. 24888/94.
46. U. Kilkelly, ‘CRC in Litigation under the ECHR’, in T. Liefaard and
J.E. Doek, Litigating the Rights of the Child (to be published in 2014).
47. S.C. v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (2004) No. 60958/00, para. 29.
48. Ibid., para. 29.
49. General Comment No. 10, Children’s rights in juvenile justice, UN Doc.
CRC/C/GC/10.
50. Although the Beijing Rules, Havana Rules and Riyadh Guidelines are as
UN Resolutions strictly not legally binding, the UN Committee on the
Rights of Child urges CRC member states to incorporate these stan-
dards in domestic juvenile justice policies and legislation; see General
Comment No. 10, Children’s rights in juvenile justice, UN Doc. CRC/C/
GC/10, para. 4.
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guardians, and to have legal or other appropriate assis-
tance in the preparation and presentation of his or her
defence’. Furthermore, Article 40(2)(b)(iii) of the CRC
requires that children accused of a criminal offence have
the right to a fair hearing before a competent, indepen-
dent and impartial authority or judicial body, in the
presence of legal or other appropriate representation as
well as his parents or legal guardians. Legal or other
appropriate assistance is regarded a fundamental ele-
ment of a child’s right to a fair trial. Particularly with
regard to assistance of children deprived of their liberty,
among others in the context of juvenile justice (i.e.
arrest, detention or imprisonment), Article 37(d) CRC
stipulates that ‘every child deprived of his or her liberty
shall have the right to prompt access to legal and other
appropriate assistance’, which implies, among others,
that a child should receive immediate access to legal and
other appropriate assistance after arrest.51
The Beijing Rules and Havana Rules enshrine similar
provisions. If a juvenile were arrested or held in pre-
trial detention, Rule 18(a) of the Havana Rules provides
that the juvenile ‘should have the right of legal counsel
and be enabled to apply for free legal aid, where such
aid is available’. Moreover, Rule 15.1 of the Beijing
Rules underscores that the juvenile has the right to be
represented by a legal adviser or to apply for free legal
aid ‘throughout the proceedings’. Rule 15.2 adds that
parents or the guardian has the right to participate in
the proceedings as long as this serves the interest of the
juvenile. According to the commentary to these Beijing
Rules provisions, legal counsel and free legal aid are
required to provide the juvenile with legal assistance,
whereas the participation of the parents or guardian
should be regarded as ‘general psychological and emo-
tional assistance to the juvenile’ throughout the entire
procedure.
Neither the CRC nor the Beijing Rules and Havana
Rules explicitly recognise legal and/or other appropriate
assistance at the stage of the first police interrogations.
However, this seems to be implied. According to the
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child in its
General Comment No. 10, the right to presence of legal
representation under Article 40(2)(b)(iii) CRC ‘should
not be limited to the trial before the court or other judi-
cial body, but also applies to all other stages of the pro-
cess, beginning with the interviewing (interrogation) of
the child by the police’.52 Legal assistance at all stages of
the proceedings should guarantee that all decisions in
the context of the juvenile justice proceedings are ‘the
result of a process in which the human rights of the
child and legal safeguards are fully respected’.53 The
51. T. Liefaard, Deprivation of Liberty of Children in Light of International
Human Rights Law and Standards (2008), at 209. Note that Art. 37(d)
of the CRC aims to protect the right to liberty, while Art. 40 of the CRC
safeguards the right to a fair trial. In addition, it is interesting that
Art. 37(d) of the CRC is formulated cumulatively: ‘legal and other
appropriate assistance’.
52. General Comment No. 10, Children’s rights in juvenile justice, UN Doc.
CRC/C/GC/10, para. 52.
53. Ibid., para. 52.
Committee explicitly recognises the juvenile’s right to
legal counsel at the stage of police interrogations under
the CRC. Additionally, the Committee highlights that
parents or legal guardians should also be present at the
juvenile’s police interrogation ‘because they can provide
general psychological and emotional assistance to the
child’.54 This does not mean, according to the Commit-
tee, that parents can act in defence of the child.55
Furthermore, in its commentary to Article 40(2)(b)(iv)
of the CRC, the Committee reiterates that ‘the child
being questioned [by the police] must have access to a
legal or other appropriate representative, and must be
able to request the presence of his/her parent(s) during
questioning’, since this is vital for the protection of
children against compulsory self-incrimination.56
According to the Committee, there is a need for ‘inde-
pendent scrutiny of the methods of interrogation to
ensure that the evidence is voluntary and not coerced,
given the totality of the circumstances, and is reliable’.57
The presence of legal or other counsel, parent(s), or
independent representatives of the child during the
juvenile’s police interrogations should therefore be an
important factor in the court’s determination of the vol-
untary nature and reliability of a confession before using
it as evidence.58
Moreover, the UN Committee on the Rights of the
Child emphasises that children have the right to effec-
tively participate during all stages of the juvenile justice
proceedings.59 Effective participation in the proceedings
is a right that can be derived from the child’s fundamen-
tal right to be heard (Article 12(1) and (2) of the CRC)
and can be considered an essential requirement of a fair
trial (Article 40(2) of the CRC).60 Effective participation
implies that the child should be sufficiently informed of
the charges and the juvenile justice procedures, includ-
ing the possible sentences that could be imposed.61 In
fact, according to the Committee, the child should be
provided with enough information to have an active role
in determining his defence strategy.62 Legal assistance,
free of charge, should be regarded a prerequisite of
effective participation.63 Since the first police interroga-
tion (i.e. the suspect’s initial choice whether to make use
of his right to remain silent or to testify to the police) is
crucial for the defence strategy in the entire case, it can
be concluded that the child’s right to have an active role
in determining the defence strategy under the CRC
54. Ibid., para. 53. This seems to link up with the cumulative wording of
Art. 37(d) of the CRC.
55. Ibid., para. 53. Note that Dutch law stipulates that parents act in the
defence of their child; Art. 496 2) of the CCP.
56. Ibid., paras. 57 and 58.
57. Ibid., para. 58.
58. Ibid., para. 58.
59. Ibid., para. 44.
60. Ibid., paras. 43-46.
61. Ibid., para. 44. See also Dutch Supreme Court, 28 August 2012,
ECLI:NL:PHR:2012:BX3807 (see Conclusion of A-Gl Vellinga).
62. General Comment No. 10, Children’s rights in juvenile justice, UN Doc.
CRC/C/GC/10, para. 46.
63. Ibid., para. 49.
212
ELR December 2014 | No. 4
should imply a right to legal counsel as from the first
police interrogation.
The Committee does not address the right to waiver nor
does the CRC provide such a right. In this regard, there
is some ambivalence about the legal position of the
child. With reference to Article 12 of the CRC, the
Committee strongly states that it is the right of the child
to be heard directly (i.e. not only through a representa-
tive) and that ‘[t]his right must be fully observed at all
stages of the process, starting with the [the] pre-trial
stage when the child has the right to remain silent, as
well as the right to be heard by the police […].64 This
seems to leave room for acceptance of leeway for the
child to waive his right to consult a lawyer.65 At the
same time, the Committee seems to proclaim a more
protective approach, meaning that a child should be
legally represented in order to safeguard his right to
effectively participate throughout the process and have
his fair trial rights adequately protected.66 In light of the
latter approach, the Committee underscores that ‘other
appropriate assistance is possible (e.g. social worker),
but [that] that person must have sufficient knowledge
and understanding of the various legal aspects of the
process of juvenile justice and must be trained to work
with children in conflict with the law’.67
4.2.2 Council of Europe
At the European level, the Council of Europe has
developed various children’s rights standards that spe-
cifically focus on children in the juvenile justice system.
Some of these standards are relevant for the right to
legal counsel at the stage of the police interrogations.
The European Rules for juvenile offenders subject to
sanctions and measures (2008) stipulate that juvenile
justice systems should ensure the juvenile’s effective
participation in the proceedings (Rule 13). According to
the commentary to this provision, effective participation
implies that the juvenile is provided with legal assis-
tance.68 When deprivation of liberty of the juvenile is a
possibility, the juvenile has a right to legal counsel as
from ‘the outset of the procedure’.69 The European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) has
also emphasised the significance of access to legal assis-
tance at the stage of police interrogations.70 The CPT
also urgently requested more attention for the particular
64. Ibid., para. 44.
65. This seems to find support in the Committee’s general approach to the
right to be heard in General Comment No. 12, The Right of the child to
be heard, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/12, para. 35: ‘After the child has deci-
ded to be heard, he or she will have to decide how to be heard: "either
directly, or through a representative or appropriate body." The Com-
mittee recommends that, wherever possible, the child must be given the
opportunity to be directly heard in any proceedings.’ See also General
Comment No. 12, The Right of the child to be heard, UN Doc. CRC/C/
GC/12, para. 58 ff.
66. General Comment No. 10, Children’s rights in juvenile justice, UN Doc.
CRC/C/GC/10, para. 49.
67. Ibid.
68. CM(2008)128 addendum 1.
69. Ibid.
70. CPT Standards (CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 - Rev. 2013), at 15-16; see also at
83 ff. for more detailed guidance on the position of juveniles deprived
of their liberty.
vulnerability of juveniles during police custody during
the drafting of the Rules.71 According to the CPT, the
Rules should expressly prescribe that juveniles in police
custody ‘shall not be required to make any statement or
sign any document related to the offence of which they
are suspected without a lawyer and/or a trusted person
being present and assisting them’.72
Although the European Rules for Juvenile Offenders
were not altered accordingly, a comparable standard has
been incorporated in the Guidelines on Child Friendly
Justice (2010). Guideline 30 stipulates that ‘a child who
has been taken into custody should not be questioned in
respect of criminal behaviour, or asked to make or sign a
statement concerning such involvement, except in the
presence of a lawyer or one of the child’s parents or, if
no parent is available, another person whom the child
trusts’.73
4.3 Protection and Effective Participation
When taking into account international children’s rights
standards, the child’s right to legal counsel as from the
stage of police interrogations can be regarded as an
essential requirement for a fair trial for two reasons.
First, because children in particular, given their
dependency and vulnerability, should be protected
against self-incrimination or the use of physical or men-
tal force and other human rights violations during police
interrogations. Second, legal assistance in the early stage
of the police interrogations is crucial for enabling the
child to participate effectively in the proceedings.
Taken together, these two notions embody the
ambivalent image of the child that lies at the heart of the
international framework of children’s rights as it is
embedded in the CRC.74 On the one hand, children are
considered to be particularly vulnerable, because they
are not yet fully developed – both physically and
psychologically – and have specific emotional and edu-
cational needs. Consequently, they are entitled to special
protection and care.75 On the other hand, the CRC
clearly expresses the recognition of the child as a subject
of rights and as an individual who should be considered
capable to exercise his own rights and of making his own
decisions, in accordance with the child’s evolving
capacities (Article 5 of the CRC). In light of this, States
Parties are called upon to set a minimum age of criminal
responsibility (MACR), above which a child can be held
accountable, which may very well come with an
assumed capacity to participate independently in crimi-
nal justice proceedings (see, e.g., GC No. 10, para. 45).
The child furthermore has a right to be heard which
should be respected, and his opinion has to be given due
71. CPT, 18th General Report (2007-2008), para. 24
72. Ibid., para. 24.
73. Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on
child-friendly justice (2010).
74. See also e.g. T. Liefaard, ‘Child Soldiers: Towards a Rights Based Image-
ry’, in C. Brants, A. Hol & D. Siegel (eds.), Transitional Justice. Images
and Memories (2013) 161.
75. See Preamble of the CRC. See also General Comment No. 10, Chil-
dren’s rights in juvenile justice, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/10, para. 10.
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weight in according with his age and maturity. These
rights also affect juvenile justice proceedings.76
International children’s rights standards are not entirely
clear whether children have the right to waive their
right to counsel. As to this, one may question to what
extent the particularly difficult context of the first police
interrogations is reason enough to let protection out-
weigh the assumed (relative) autonomy of the child for
the sake of his future best interests, as is suggested by
the recent EU Commission proposal and the Dutch
draft bills.
In light of the pedagogical objectives of juvenile justice,
one may query what can be learned from development
psychological research on the value of legal counsel in
the earliest stages of criminal justice proceedings, in
particular on the issue of children and police interroga-
tions. This will be addressed in the next paragraph.
5 Juveniles’ Right to Counsel:
A Developmental
Psychological Perspective
5.1 Developmental Psychological Research
There is an extensive body of developmental psycholog-
ical and empirical research on police interrogations of
juveniles available, particularly in the United States.
The juvenile’s ability to understand and exercise so-
called Miranda rights77 (i.e. the right to remain silent
and the right to legal counsel prior to, and during police
interrogations) has been the subject of research by
numerous American scholars. Among others, Thomas
76. See Art. 12 CRC. See also General Comment No. 12, The Right of the
child to be heard, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/12. See also L. Krappmann,
‘The Weight of the Child’s View’, 18-4 International Journal of Chil-
dren’s Rights 501 (2010).
77. The concept of ‘Miranda rights’ was established in the US criminal jus-
tice system as a result of the 1966 Miranda v. Arizona case, in which
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that: ‘The person in custody must, prior
to interrogation, be clearly informed that he has the right to remain
silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court; he
must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer
and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is
indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.’ See U.S.
Supreme Court, Miranda v. Arizona, 13 June 1966, 384 U.S. 436.
Grisso and Barry C. Feld conducted ground-breaking
research in this particular field of study.78
5.2 Juveniles’ Cognitive Ability and Maturity of
Judgment
In 2012, Feld published his latest study on juveniles and
police interrogations titled Kids, Cops and Confessions,
which includes a comprehensive overview of develop-
mental psychological research and literature on this
issue.79 Based on an extensive body of research, Feld
underscores the importance of making a distinction
between a juvenile’s cognitive ability (capacity to under-
stand) and maturity of judgment (capability to make
grown-up decisions) when it comes to determining his
ability to effectively exercise Miranda rights during
police interrogations.80
Research indicates that – since juveniles’ general
intellectual ability, verbal ability, attention and execu-
tive functioning significantly improve with age – young
juveniles in particular may not yet have obtained the
cognitive abilities required to understand and effectively
participate in juvenile justice proceedings.81 Multiple
studies show that juveniles 15 years of age and younger
as well as 16- and 17-year-olds with a low IQ (below 85)
have far more difficulties understanding Miranda rights
than adults do, even compared to adults with a low IQ.82
Most 16- and 17-year-old juveniles, however, are con-
78. See amongst others: T. Grisso, 'Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda
Rights: An Empirical Analysis’, 68 California Law Review 1134 (1980);
T. Grisso, ‘The Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants’, 3 Psy-
chology, Public Policy & Law 3 (1997); T. Grisso, Instruments for
Assessing Understanding and Appreciation of Miranda Rights (1998);
T. Grisso, ‘What We Know about Youths’ Capacities as Trial Defend-
ants’, in T. Grisso and R.G. Schwartz (eds.), Youth on Trial: A Develop-
mental Perspective on Juvenile Justice (2000) 139; T. Grisso et al.,
‘Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’
and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants’, 27 Law and Human Behav-
ior 333 (2003); B.C. Feld, ‘Juveniles’ Competence to Exercise Miranda
Rights: An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice’, 91 Minnesota Law
Review 26 (2006); B.C. Feld, ‘Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An
Empirical Study of Policy and Practice’, 97 Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology 219 (2006); B.C. Feld, Kids, Cops, and Confessions
(2012).
79. B.C. Feld (2012), above n. 78.
80. B.C. Feld (2012), above n. 78, at 251.
81. T. Grisso (1980), above n. 78, at 1160; T. Grisso (1997), above n. 78;
J. Viljoen and R. Roesch, ‘Competence to Waive interrogation Rights
and Adjudicative Competence in Adolescent Defendants: Cognitive
Development, Attorney Contact, and Psychological Symptoms’, 29 Law
and Human Behavior 723 (2005), at 736; as referred to in B.C. Feld
(2012), above n. 78, at 52. See also: I. Weijers and T. Grisso, ‘Criminal
Responsibility of Adolescents Youth as Junior Citizenship’, in J. Junger-
Tas and F. Duenkel (eds.), Reforming Juvenile Justice (2009) 45;
C. Driver and E.M. Brank, ‘Juveniles’ Knowledge of the Court Process:
Instruction from an Electronic Source’, 27 Behavioral Sciences and the
Law 627 (2009); as referred to in S. Rap, The Participation of Juvenile
Defendants in the Youth Court (2013), at 108-9.
82. J. Viljoen, J. Klaver & R. Roesch, ‘Legal Decisions of Preadolescent and
Adolescent Defendants: Predictors of Confessions, Pleas, Communica-
tion with Attorneys, and Appeals’, 29 Law and Human Behavior 253
(2005); J. Viljoen and R. Roesch (2005), above n. 81; S.M. Kassin et al.,
‘Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations’, 34
Law and Human Behavior 49 (2009); as referred to in B.C. Feld, (2012),
above n. 78, at 52-53.
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sidered to be cognitively able to understand the meaning
of Miranda rights.83
However, the ability to understand Miranda rights does
not imply that 16- and 17-year-olds should be consider-
ed generally capable of adequately exercising Miranda
rights.84 This requires ‘mature decision-making compe-
tence’ as well.85 Research shows that juveniles, due to
their developmental stage, are generally not yet able to
make ‘grown-up decisions’.86 Juveniles are generally
impulsive decision makers,87 who lack the ability to
recognise and weigh risks in decision making,88 which is
a result of juveniles’ general incompetence to foresee
and appreciate long-term consequences of decisions.89
This may cause juveniles, for example, to (falsely) con-
fess for the sole purpose of ending the interrogation,
without considering the negative long-term consequen-
ces of such a (false) confession.90 Besides, juveniles do
not appreciate the significance of rights in the same way
83. R. Abramovitch, K.L. Higgins-Biss & S.R. Biss, ‘Young Persons’ Compre-
hension of Waivers in Criminal Proceedings’, 35 Canadian Journal of
Criminology 309 (1993); R. Abramovitch, M. Peterson-Badali &
M. Rohan, ‘Young People’s Understanding and Assertion of Their
Rights to Silence and Legal Counsel’, 37 Canadian Journal of Criminol-
ogy 1 (1995); M. Beyer, ‘Immaturity, Culpability and Competency in
Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases’, 15-2 Law and Human Behavior 125
(2000); A. Redlich, M. Silverman & H. Steiner, ‘Pre-adjudicative and
Adjudicative Competence in Juveniles and Young Adults’, 21 Behavioral
Science & the Law 393 (2003); J. Viljoen and R. Roesch (2005), above
n. 81; A. Goldstein and N.E.S. Goldstein, Evaluating Capacity to Waive
Miranda Rights (2010); as referred to in B.C. Feld (2012), above n. 78,
at 53 and 251. See also: T. Grisso et al. (2003), above n. 78.
84. T. Grisso and C. Pomiciter, ‘Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical
Study of procedures, Safeguards and Rights Waiver’, 1 Law and Human
Behavior 321 (1977); M. Beyer, ‘Immaturity, Culpability and Compe-
tency in Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases’, 15-2 Law and Human Behav-
ior 125 (2000); as referred to in B.C. Feld (2012), above n. 78, at 53.
85. T. Grisso et al. (2003), above n. 78, at 357; B.C. Feld (2012), above n.
78, at 251.
86. T. Grisso et al. (2003), above n. 78; as referred to in B.C. Feld (2012),
above n. 78, at 55.
87. Baird et al., ‘Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Facial Affect
Recognition in Children and Adolescents’, 38 Journal of the American
Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 195 (1999); R.E. Dahl,
‘Affect Regulation, Brain Development, and Behavioral/Emotional
Health in Adolescence’, 6 CNS Spectrums 60 (2001); D.E. Arredondo,
‘Child Development, Children’s Mental Health and the Juvenile Justice
System: Principles of Effective Decision-Making’, 14 Stanford Law &
Policy Review 13 (2003); A. Redlich, M. Silverman & H. Steiner, ‘Pre-
adjudicative and Adjudicative Competence in Juveniles and Young
Adults’, 21 Behavioral Sciences & the Law 393 (2003); S.A. Gruber and
D.A. Yurgelun-Todd, ‘Neurobiology and the Law: A Role in Juvenile
Justice’, 3 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 321 (2006); as referred
to in B.C. Feld (2012), above n. 78, at 49-50.
88. L. Furby and R. Beyt-Marom, ‘Risk Taking in Adolescence: A Decision-
Making Perspective’, 12 Developmental Review 1 (1992); W. Gardner,
‘A Life-Span Rational Choice Theory of Risk Taking’, in N.J. Bell and
R.W. Bell (eds.), Adolescent Risk Taking (1993); T. Grisso (2000), above
n. 78; E. Scott, ‘The Legal Construction of Childhood’, 29 Hofstra Law
Review 541 (2000); as referred to in B.C. Feld (2012), above n. 78, at
48.
89. L. Steinberg, ‘Cognitive and Affective Development in Adolescence’, 9
Trends in Cognitive Science 69 (2005); as referred to in B.C. Feld
(2012), above n. 78, at 48.
90. T. Grisso, ‘Juveniles’ Waivers of Rights: Legal and Psychological Compe-
tence’, 3 Perspectives in Law & Psychology (1981); L. Steinberg and
E. Cauffman, ‘Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Fac-
tors in Adolescent Decision-Making’, 20 Law and Human Behavior 249
(1996); T. Grisso et al. (2003), above n. 78; as referred to in B.C. Feld
(2012), above n. 78, at 56-57.
adults do,91 which may cause juveniles to waive their
rights (e.g. the right to remain silent and the right to
legal counsel during police interrogations) more often
and less deliberately.92 Furthermore, juveniles generally
lack the competence to make autonomous decisions due
to their particular susceptibility to external, social influ-
ences.93 Juveniles are very sensitive to status differences
(e.g. between the interrogating police officer and the
juvenile suspect) and have a general eagerness to comply
with adult authority figures.94 This makes juveniles
particularly vulnerable when subjected to suggestive and
(psychologically) coercive interrogation techniques,95
which might cause them, for example, to (falsely)
confess in order to get the much-wanted approval of the
interrogator.96
5.3 Protection and Effective Participation:
A Developmental Psychological Perspective
The lack of understanding of rights and procedures by
younger juveniles and juveniles with a low IQ, their lack
of competence to make rational, mature decisions and
their sensitivity to external, social influences make them
particularly vulnerable during police interrogations. It is
clear that developmental psychological research sup-
ports the underlying presumption of the international
framework of children’s rights that children should be
considered particularly vulnerable – because they are
not yet fully developed – and have specific needs, which
call for a high level of protection.
In addition, these research findings give reason to care-
fully consider whether juveniles should be regarded
capable of exercising their rights independently,
particularly in the context of police interrogations. This
91. T. Grisso (1981), above n. 90; T. Grisso, ‘Juvenile Competency to Stand
Trial: Questions in an Era of Punitive Reform’, 12-3 Criminal Justice 4
(1997); K. Larson, ‘Improving the ‘Kangaroo Courts’: A Proposal for
Reform in Evaluating Juveniles’ Waiver of Miranda’, 48 Villanova Law
Review 629 (2003); as referred to in B.C. Feld (2012), above n. 78, at
53.
92. J. Viljoen, J. Klaver & R. Roesch, ‘Legal Decisions of Preadolescent and
Adolescent Defendants: Predictors of Confessions, Pleas, Communica-
tion with Attorneys, and Appeals’, 29 Law and Human Behavior 253
(2005); as referred to in B.C. Feld (2012), above n. 78, at 53.
93. B.C. Feld (2012), above n. 78, at 56.
94. G.P. Koocher, ‘Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on Chil-
dren’s Rights’, 16 Nova Law Review 711 (1992); K. Larson (2003),
above n. 91; J. Owen-Kostelnik, N.D. Repucci & J.R. Meyer, ‘Testimony
and Interrogation of Minors: Assumptions about Maturity and Morali-
ty’, 61 American Psychologist 286 (2006); S.M. Kassin et al. (2009),
above n. 82; as referred to in B.C. Feld (2012), above n. 78, at 56. See
also: T. Grisso et al. (2003), above n. 78, at 357.
95. K. Singh and G.H. Gudjonsson, ‘Interrogative Suggestibility among
Adolescent Boys and Its Relationship with Intelligence, memory, and
Cognitive Set’, 15 Journal of Adolescence 155 (1992);
G.H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions: A
Handbook (2003); N.E.S. Goldstein et al., ‘Juvenile Offenders’ Miranda
Rights Comprehension and Self-Reported Likelihood of Offering False
Confessions’, 10 Assessment 359 (2003); S.A. Drizin and R.A. Leo, ‘The
Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World’, 82 North Caroli-
na Law Review 891, at 1005 (2004); J.R. Meyer and D.N. Reppucci,
‘Police Practices and Perceptions Regarding Juvenile Interrogation and
Interrogative Suggestibility’, 25 Behavioral Sciences & the Law 757, at
764 (2007); as referred to in B.C. Feld (2012), above n. 78, at 56-58.
96. F.J. Billings et al., ‘Can Reinforcement Induce Children to Falsely
Incriminate Themselves?’, 31 Law and Human Behavior 125 (1997); as
referred to in B.C. Feld (2012), above n. 78, at 56.
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does not mean, though, that juveniles are not able to
participate at all and that they should be denied the
right to have a say in the way they participate. Yet, in
order to participate effectively in the context of police
interrogations, juveniles need more than just sufficient
information about their rights and the procedures.
Juveniles also need special guidance and support in their
decision making and protection against pressure and
suggestive interrogation techniques. Mandatory access
to a legal representative can be an important asset in this
regard.
6 Juveniles’ Right to Counsel
in the Dutch Juvenile Justice
System
In the previous paragraphs, we have scrutinised the
underlying rationale and the significance of a youth-
specific approach to the legal position of juveniles at the
stage of police interrogations both from a children’s
rights and a developmental psychological perspective. A
juvenile’s right to (legal) counsel at the stage of police
interrogations finds its justification in the notions of
‘protection’ and ‘effective participation’. Developmental
psychological research confirms and concretises the par-
ticularly vulnerable position of juveniles during police
interrogations – and, thus, the need for special measures
of protection – and indicates that particular safeguards
are required to ensure a juvenile’s effective participa-
tion.
What are the implications of these insights for a
juvenile’s right to (legal) counsel at the stage of police
interrogations and for the pending Dutch draft bills in
particular? Three core issues regarding the right to
counsel will be addressed in the context of the Dutch
juvenile justice system: the possibility of waiver, the role
of the lawyer and the presence of a ‘person of trust’ dur-
ing police interrogations.
6.1 Possibility of Waiver
The 2014 Draft Bill on implementing EU Directive
(2013/48/EU) proposes that every minor from 12 until
17 years of age who is suspected of committing an
offence is entitled to consultation with a lawyer prior to
the first police interrogation, without the possibility of
waiver. This approach is at odds with the case law of the
ECtHR, in which the possibility of waiving a juvenile’s
right to counsel is explicitly recognised;97 a position that
is also supported by various Dutch courts and has not
been contested by the UN Committee on the Rights of
the Child. Developmental psychological insights
indicate, however, that juveniles 15 years of age and
younger as well as 16- and 17-year-olds with a low IQ
(below 85) often have trouble understanding their fair
trial rights in the context of police interrogations.
97. Panovits v. Cyprus, ECHR (2008) No. 4268/04, para. 68.
Although most 16- and 17-year-olds are considered to
be cognitively able to understand their rights, they too
lack ‘mature decision-making competence’. Providing
juveniles, including 16- and 17-year-olds, with the
possibility of waiving their right to legal counsel there-
fore seems inappropriate. This is particularly true
because developmental psychological research points
out that juveniles are in need of special protection, assis-
tance and guidance at the stage of police interrogations
to prevent them from coerced or unintended self-
incrimination, but also to enable them to participate
effectively and in accordance with their capacities. Prior
consultation with a lawyer and (legal) assistance during
interrogation therefore seems a crucial prerequisite for
safeguarding a juvenile’s right to a fair trial.
From this perspective, the approach of the Dutch legis-
lator not to grant arrested juvenile suspects the right to
waive their right to consult a lawyer prior to the first
police interrogation appears to be defendable. However,
some have argued that mandatory consultation of legal
counsel might de facto increase the risk that juvenile sus-
pects will be deprived of their liberty unnecessarily as it
may be complicated or even impossible to always have a
lawyer present within a few hours. In the case of minor
offences in particular, the consequences may be dispro-
portionate.98 We consider this a practical issue, which
calls for an adequate practical solution. Yet, this practi-
cal issue ultimately touches upon a more fundamental
tension between a juvenile’s right to a fair trial
(Article 40(2) of the CRC), which calls for (mandatory)
legal consultation, and his right to personal liberty,
which demands that deprivation of liberty is used only
as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropri-
ate period of time (Article 37(b) of the CRC).
A practical solution to uplift this tension in cases in
which there is no lawyer available on short notice could
be to consider postponing the police interrogation for a
few hours (e.g. with a maximum of 12 hours) while
allowing the arrested juvenile to await his interrogation
at home. Particularly in cases with no serious risk of
collusion or absconding, there will not always be a need
to deprive an arrested juvenile of his liberty in the
period between the arrest and the first police interroga-
tion.99 This practical solution grants a juvenile’s (man-
datory) consultation of a lawyer prior to the first police
interrogation, while also respecting the children’s rights
notion of deprivation of liberty as a last resort. It does,
however, require specialised police staff, who are suffi-
ciently trained in applying this ‘last resort’ principle in
their decisions concerning arrested juveniles.100
98. W.J. Verhoeven and L. Stevens, Rechtsbijstand bij politieverhoor. Eval-
uatie van de Aanwijzing rechtsbijstand politieverhoor in Amsterdam-
Amstelland, Groningen, Haaglanden, Limburg-Zuid, Midden- en West-
Brabant en Utrecht (2013), at 314.
99. If an arrested juvenile is released until the first police interrogation, it is
important that he remains entitled to be regarded as an ‘arrested sus-
pect’ for the purpose of falling within the scope of the Salduz case law.
100. Cf. General Comment No. 10, Children’s rights in juvenile justice, UN
Doc. CRC/C/GC/10, para. 90.
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In cases of severe offences or when there is a serious risk
of collusion or absconding, the police will probably not
consider the release of an arrested juvenile prior to the
first interrogation appropriate. In these cases it is of
utmost importance that the period between the arrest
and the first police interrogation is as short as possible.
This does not, however, justify abandoning a juvenile’s
(mandatory) consultation of a lawyer prior to the inter-
rogation, if no lawyer is available on short notice. In
cases of severe offences, the stakes are high for an
accused juvenile, which makes a fair trial paramount. As
we have seen, (mandatory) legal counsel at the stage of
police interrogations seems of vital importance for a fair
trial, particularly when juveniles are concerned (see
para. 5). A practical solution in these cases could be to
consider the use of more innovative methods of legal
consultation (i.e. via audiovisual means) if lawyers are
not directly available at the police station.
6.2 Role of the Lawyer
The juvenile’s need for special protection, assistance
and guidance has important implications for the role of
the defence lawyer at the stage of the police interroga-
tions.101 It is the lawyer’s responsibility to provide for
adequate protection against (potential) fair trial viola-
tions and to facilitate the juvenile’s effective participa-
tion. His responsibility to enable the juvenile’s effective
participation starts at the consultation prior to the first
interrogation. During this meeting, he must adequately
inform the juvenile about his rights and the procedure
and empower the juvenile to express his own views
about his case. This implies the lawyer’s responsibility
to ensure that the juvenile can exercise his right to be
heard in accordance with Article 12 of the CRC.102
Together, the lawyer and the juvenile can determine the
‘defence strategy’. Subsequently, the lawyer should
safeguard the necessary conditions for effective partici-
pation of the juvenile during the police interrogations.
The lawyer must make sure that the juvenile under-
stands what is said during the interrogation and inter-
vene in case he thinks the juvenile does not. In addition,
he must be particularly intent on preventing the juvenile
from being subjected to suggestive interrogation techni-
ques and long-lasting interrogations, since this might
badly influence the decision-making capacities of the
juvenile. Moreover, sufficient protection of the juvenile
suspect against compulsory self-incrimination or other
fair trial violations during police interrogations require
the lawyer to closely monitor the interrogation and
actively intervene in case the rights of the juvenile are
violated.
101. See also E. Buss, ‘The role of Lawyers in Promoting Juveniles’ Compe-
tence as Defendants’, in T. Grisso and R.G. Schwartz (eds.), Youth on
Trial. Developmental Perspectives on Juvenile Justice (2000) 243.
102. Note Art. 503 of the CCP, which stipulates that the lawyer of a juvenile
younger than sixteen years can exercise the procedural rights of the
juvenile independently. It is hard to reconcile this provision with the
international children’s rights frame and the responsibility of the lawyer
as the child’s representative; see also T. Liefaard, S.E. Rap & I. Weijers,
‘De positie van de jeugdige verdachte in het strafproces’, 8-4 Strafblad
283 (2010).
Some have argued that, in practice, lawyers too often
recommend their juvenile clients to make use of their
right to remain silent, even in minor cases in which the
guilt of the juvenile is claimed to be rather obvious.
This approach could prevent the use of diversion mech-
anisms at the discretion of the police (such as the Dutch
diversion programme ‘HALT’), which – in the Dutch
system – requires the juvenile’s approval.103 According
to some, this undermines the pedagogical character of
juvenile justice.104 Although we consider the assump-
tion that, in practice, lawyers too often recommend their
juvenile clients to make use of their right to remain
silent primarily a practical issue, it could essentially boil
down to a more fundamental tension between the right
to a fair trial (cf. Article 40(2) CRC) and the pedagogical
interests of juvenile justice (cf. Article 40(1) CRC).
Yet, it gives no reason to question the added value of a
juvenile’s compulsory consultation of a lawyer. In fact,
the lawyer has an important role in sufficiently inform-
ing the juvenile about the consequences of different
‘defence strategies’, including the consequences of mak-
ing use of the right to remain silent in less serious cases,
which prevent the use of diversion programs, such as
HALT. After all, developmental psychological research
indicates that juveniles are generally not capable of
understanding and overseeing these consequences with-
out professional assistance (see para. 5). When advising
the juvenile about a defence strategy during the consul-
tation, the lawyer has the complex but important task to
adhere to the interests of a fair trial (e.g. the right to
remain silent) and the interests of a fast and pedagogi-
cally effective intervention (e.g. through diversion)
while taking into account the best interests of the
juvenile (cf. Article 3(1) of the CRC). This underscores
the importance of (investing in) specialised juvenile law-
yers who are fully aware of the impact of a chosen
defence strategy.105
6.3 Presence of a ‘Person of Trust’ during
Interrogations
In the 2014 Draft Bill on implementing EU Directive
(2013/48/EU), the Dutch legislator explicitly chose to
implement the juvenile’s right to legal counsel rather
than other forms of representation at the stage of police
interrogations. In the Explanatory Memorandum the
legislator explains that juveniles and their parents or
guardians do not always have the same interests, which
makes it problematic to categorical qualify parents and
103. R. Quint, ‘Mogelijke onwenselijke gevolgen van de consultatie- en ver-
hoorbijstand voor ‘Haltjongeren’: Een perspectief vanuit Halt’, 82 Tijds-
chrift voor Familie- en Jeugdrecht 216 (2010); R. Quint, ‘Salduz-
rechtspraak risico voor Halt-jongeren’, 86 Nederlands Juristenblad 677
(2011). See also W.J. Verhoeven and L. Stevens, Rechtsbijstand bij
politieverhoor. Evaluatie van de Aanwijzing rechtsbijstand politiever-
hoor in Amsterdam-Amstelland, Groningen, Haaglanden, Limburg-
Zuid, Midden- en West-Brabant en Utrecht (2013), at 314; J.A.C. Bar-
tels, ‘De rechtspositie van het verdachte kind tijdens het politieverhoor’,
in C. Mak et al. (eds.), Rechten van het kind en waardigheid (2013)
291, at 298 ff.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.See also General Comment No. 10, Children’s rights in juvenile jus-
tice, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/10, para. 90.
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guardians as appropriate representatives during police
interrogations.
The decision to favour legal assistance over other assis-
tance can be defended, also in light of the recommenda-
tions of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,
which strongly affirm the need for legal expertise in this
particular phase of the criminal justice process, even
though Article 40(2) of the CRC leaves room for other
forms of assistance. However, the reasoning of the
legislator with regard to the role of parents is not very
convincing. Parental support should not be considered
the only way of granting ‘other appropriate assistance’,
and one could argue that parental support should be an
additional form of assistance (e.g. emotional) to address
the particularly vulnerable position of juveniles during
police interrogation.106 Parental involvement should,
however, always be considered in light of the juvenile’s
best interests, which may require that the parents will
not be allowed to be present. In this regard, one should
also be aware that in some cases the presence of parents
during police interrogations could have a negative
impact on the juvenile’s effective participation, for
example, because of feelings of shame or fear.107 For this
reason, juveniles should always have the possibility to
waive their right to have one of their parents present
during interrogation. This also implies that parents or
guardians themselves should not have an independent
right to be present during the interrogations of their
child.
7 Concluding Remarks
The right to counsel of juveniles at the stage of police
interrogations has gained significant attention since the
Salduz ruling of the European Court on Human Rights
in 2008. The legislative and policy developments that
have taken place since then reveal a shared desire to
accommodate the legal position of juveniles in this par-
ticularly complex phase of the criminal justice proceed-
ings. We have tried to contribute to this development by
addressing the justification for and the particularities of
a youth-specific approach to the right to counsel from a
multidisciplinary perspective. We hope that it can assist
both the European and Dutch legislator on their way to
awarding juveniles in conflict with the law a fair and
youth-specific treatment.
106. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child seems to prescribe such a
cumulative approach to the right to have a lawyer and another appro-
priate representative (e.g. parents or guardians) present during police
interrogations. See General Comment No. 10, Children’s rights in juve-
nile justice, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/10, para. 53. See also the commentary
to Rule 15 of the Beijing Rules (see para. 4.2 above). The Dutch
Supreme Court, however, adopted an alternative approach: ‘assistance
by a lawyer or another person of trust’. See Dutch Supreme Court, 30
June 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH3081, para. 2.6.
107. I. Weijers, M. Bruning & G. de Jonge, ‘Ouders dwingen tot bijwonen
jeugdstrafzitting is slecht idee’, 6 Tijdschrift voor Familie- en Jeugdrecht
132 (2005).
218
ELR December 2014 | No. 4
